Introduction
In several economic environments, the utility of an agent is affected both by some uncertain state of the world and by the actions of others. Consider a brand new operating system, of unknown quality. Each consumer cares not only about its quality, but also about whether others will adopt it. A consumer who considers buying the new system does not know how many after him will also adopt it, and may not know exactly how many before him have already adopted it. Alternatively, consider a farmer who must decide to plant either corn or soybeans at the start of the season but is uncertain about their relative demand by the end of the season. Even though he does not know what other farmers will choose, the choices of others affect the relative profitability of each crop: if most farmers plant corn, then the price of corn will be lower, and so it is more profitable to plant soybeans. Similar stories apply to investment in assets with unknown fundamentals, voting, contributions to public goods of uncertain quality, network congestion, and many other environments.
By observing a sample of the actions of others, an agent obtains information both about the state of the world and about how others behave. The farmer deciding between crops may have private information on how the demand will be at the end of the season.
He may also observe the decisions of some of his neighbors. With these two sources of information he must form beliefs about both the future demand and about the actions of those farmers he does not observe. With payoff externalities, standard informational externalities are confounded with coordination motives. When a farmer observes that one of his neighbors plants corn, this might mean that his neighbor believes corn to be in high demand, as in standard models of observational learning. It may also mean that most farmers are planting corn.
I study the outcomes of observational learning in large games. In the standard setup of observational learning, (complete) learning has a simple definition: the fraction of adopters of the superior action must approach one. When payoffs depend on others' actions, the right action depends not only on the state of the world, but also on what others do. I focus then on whether realized actions are ex-post optimal. I say that strategic learning occurs when agents' actions are ex-post optimal given both the state of the world and the realized actions of others. The main message of this paper is simple: Proposition 2. Strategic learning occurs, provided that the signal structure is sufficiently informative.
The notion of strategic learning is demanding: it requires that agents not only learn about the state of the world, but also that they correctly anticipate others' actions and best respond to them. In what follows I describe the framework and I present the intuition behind this result.
Agents are exogenously ordered in a sequence and are uncertain about their position in it. There are two, a priori equally likely, states of the world. Each agent receives a private signal about the underlying state of the world and observes the actions of some of his predecessors. Then, he makes a once-and-for-all decision between two actions (zero and one). The main innovation with respect to the standard setup is that an agent's payoff depends not only on his own action and the unknown state of the world, but also on the proportion X of agents who choose action one My framework applies to the examples described before (coordination games, like the adoption of a new operating system, and anti-coordination games, like the example of farmers). I do not impose any particular functional form on how payoffs depend on X.
Payoff interdependence adds a strategic consideration to observational learning: each agent understands that since his own action is observed by some of his successors, it partly determines their decisions. An agent who can affect aggregate outcomes needs to take into account the effect of his decision on others' actions. Gallice and Monzón [2016] show that this strategic component can have a strong effect on the aggregate play when there is a finite number of agents who never make mistakes. 1 However, this should intuitively be less relevant in large games. Individual farmers do not expect to be able to affect aggregate supply, and individual consumers typically do not believe that they can determine the overall adoption rate of a new operating system. In this paper I assume that agents make mistakes with arbitrarily small probability. I show that this implies that agents cannot individually determine the aggregate play.
The intuition behind strategic learning is simple and has two components. First, although each agent could in principle affect aggregate outcomes, in practice there are no butterfly effects. As the number of agents grows large, each individual's action has a smaller effect on the proportion X. Second, as each agent foresees that each action has a small effect on X, he can treat the proportion X as given. Realized payoffs depend (approximately) only on the state of the world and his own action. In this sense, I translate a game of observational learning with payoff externalities into a game of observational learning without them. Then, I use tools of standard observational learning to show that strategic learning occurs. I develop this intuition in detail in what follows.
The first main result (Proposition 1) shows that as the number of agents grows large, the proportion X converges to its expectation in each state of the world. This proposition addresses two challenges that result from the additional strategic factors associated with payoff externalities. First, each agent needs to anticipate how others will behave. Second, each agent may need to account for the effect of his own action on others' decisions.
I develop a novel approach to show convergence of the proportion X. If the equilibrium strategy profile were the same regardless of the number of agents, Proposition 1 would be straightforward. Agents make mistakes with positive probability, so a fixed strategy profile would create an irreducible and aperiodic Markov Chain over actions.
Thus, a standard ergodic argument would lead to this result. However, as the number of agents grows, the game changes, so the equilibrium strategy profile varies with the number of agents. I use a coupling argument to show that any Markov Chain induced by a strategy profile converges to its stationary distribution. The speed of convergence has a geometric lower bound which is independent of the particular equilibrium strategy profile.
Thus, the effect of one individual's action on the proportion X wanes as the number of agents grows, even with strategy profiles that change with the number of agents. I show through this argument that the proportion X converges to its expectation. As a direct consequence, no individual agent can affect the aggregate outcome. This result holds true for all payoff specifications.
The second main result (Proposition 2) explains why strategic learning must occur in equilibrium when signals are of unbounded strength. Since the proportion X converges to its expectation in each state of the world, each agent can anticipate the payoffs he would get from each action in each state of the world. Optimality considerations limit the possible combinations of proportions X and payoffs that can occur in equilibrium. To see this, consider first a long-run outcome where in both states of the world, the payoff from choosing action one exceeds that from choosing action zero. Any agent who chooses action zero regrets it ex-post. Intuitively, an agent could instead choose action one always, and obtain higher payoffs. It follows that no positive proportion of agents can choose a dominated action.
The final step in Proposition 2 deals with long-run outcomes where agents want to choose different actions in different states of the world. I provide an improvement principle that applies to environments with payoff externalities. An individual can always copy a random action from the sample he observes. Moreover, when his private signal is strong enough, he can go against the observed action, and do (in expected terms) strictly better than the observed agent. Then, as the number of agents grows large, it must be the case that either 1) the fraction of agents who choose the superior action approaches one, or that 2) the extra payoff from choosing the right action approaches zero. In either case, there is strategic learning.
Proposition 2 provides a unique prediction of play for games with only one Nash equilibrium (e.g. an anti-coordination game). In the farmers' example, the proportion of crops planted correctly matches the demand. If instead there are several equilibria in each state of the world, Proposition 2 does not select among them. I illustrate this point through a coordination game (Example 7).
Finally, I show that some degree of information aggregation also occurs with signals of bounded strength. Lemma 7 presents a notion of bounded strategic learning. Although actions may be ex-post suboptimal with bounded signals, there is a bound on how far actions can be from optimality. This bound depends on the information structure, and approaches zero as signals' informativeness increases.
Related Literature
There is a large literature that studies observational learning, starting from the seminal contributions of Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch [1992] and Banerjee [1992] . In these papers, a set of rational agents choose sequentially between two actions. An agent's payoff depends on whether his action matches the unknown state of the world, but not on others' actions. The actions of others are relevant only because of their informational content. In Bikhchandani et al. [1992] and Banerjee [1992] , each agent knows that his own signal is not better than the signals others have received. Agents eventually follow others' behavior and disregard their own signals. Then, the optimal behavior of rational agents can prevent complete learning. Smith and Sørensen [2000] show that when signals are of unbounded strength, individuals never fully disregard their own information and complete learning occurs. Monzón and Rapp [2014] present conditions for information aggregation when agents are uncertain both about their own position in the sequence and about the positions of those they observe.
Starting with Dekel and Piccione [2000] , a line of research focuses on the outcomes of sequential voting. In Dekel and Piccione [2000] , a finite sequence of agents cast votes between two alternatives. Their focus is on the comparison between simultaneous and sequential voting. Dekel and Piccione show that any equilibrium of a simultaneous voting game is also an equilibrium when voting is sequential. In Callander [2007] , agents vote sequentially and care not only about electing the superior candidate, but also about voting for the winning candidate. Callander shows that a bandwagon eventually starts: voters ignore their private information and vote for the leading candidate. Ali and Kartik [2012] queues. Service to those in the queue is provided only in the good state of the world, but at an stochastic rate. Cripps and Thomas study the dynamics of the queue. Arieli [2017] focuses on recurring games: successive generations of agents play the same game. As in my paper, payoffs depend on the unknown state of the world, and also on the actions of others. However, payoff externalities are only local: an agent's utility is affected by the actions of others in the same generation. Arieli studies when complete learning occurs.
Besides the points already mentioned, my paper differs from Eyster et al. [2014] , Cripps and Thomas [2016] and Arieli [2017] in that an agent's payoff depends on the actions of those before and also after him in the sequence. This adds a strategic consideration to the analysis, as agents may affect future decisions.
Model
Let I = {1, . . . , T} be a set of agents, indexed by i. Agents are exogenously placed in a sequence in positions indexed by t ∈ {1 . . . , T}. The random variable Q assigns a position Q(i) to each agent i. Let q : {1, . . . , T} → {1, . . . , T} be a permutation and Q be the set of all possible permutations. All permutations are ex-ante equally likely:
T! for all q ∈ Q. Each individual has no ex-ante information about his position in the sequence. 2 There are two equally likely states of the world θ ∈ Θ = {0, 1}. Agents must choose 2 This setup corresponds to the case of symmetric position beliefs as defined in Monzón and Rapp [2014] .
between two possible actions a ∈ A = {0, 1}. The timing of the game is as follows. First, nature chooses the state of the world θ and the order of the sequence q. Agents do not observe these directly. Instead, each agent i receives a noisy signal about the state of the world and a sample of past actions. Then he makes a once-and-for-all choice.
payoffs may depend on the actions of others. Let X ≡ 1 T ∑ j∈I a j denote the proportion of agents who choose action 1, with realizations x ∈ [0, 1]. Agent i obtains utility
Private Signals
Each agent i receives a private signal S Q(i) , with realizations s ∈ S. 
DEFINITION. SIGNAL STRENGTH.
Signal strength is unbounded if 0 < G 0 (l) < 1 for all likelihood ratios l ∈ (0, ∞). Signal strength is bounded if the convex hull of supp(G) is given by co (supp(G)) = l, l , with both 0 < l < 1 < l < ∞. 4
The Sample of Past Actions
Agents observe others' actions through a simple sampling rule. Let h t = (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a t−1 ) denote a possible history of actions up to period t − 1. Let H t be the (random) history at time t, with realizations h t ∈ H t . Agent i in position q(i) = t receives a sample ξ t : H t → Ξ containing the ordered choices of his M predecessors (if available):
The first agent observes nobody's action, so he receives an empty sample. Agents in positions t ∈ {2, . . . , M} observe the actions of all their predecessors. Subsequent agents observe the actions of their M immediate predecessors.
Strategies, Mistakes and Equilibrium Existence
All information available to an agent is summarized by {s, ξ}, which is an element of S × Ξ. I assume that individuals make mistakes with small probability ε > 0, so their strategies are ε-constrained. Formally, agent i's strategy is a function σ i : S × Ξ → [ε, 1 − ε] that specifies a probability σ i (s, ξ) for choosing action 1 given the information available. Σ denotes the set of ε-constrained strategies. Let σ −i be the strategies for all players other than i. Then the profile of play is given by σ = (σ i , σ −i ). 5
Every profile σ induces a probability distribution P σ over histories H t , and consequently over proportions X. Profile σ * = σ * i , σ * −i is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the game if
A profile of play is symmetric if σ i = σ j for all i, j ∈ I.
LEMMA 1. For each T there exists a symmetric equilibrium σ * ,T .
See Appendix A.1 for the proof.
5 Mistakes are rationally anticipated. This model is equivalent to one in which agents choose from [0, 1], but they know in advance that there is a 2ε chance that their decision will be overruled by a coin flip. An alternative interpretation of this model is as follows. With probability 1 − 2ε, an agent chooses rationally from [0, 1] . With probability 2ε, the agent is a "behavioral" type. Half of behavioral types always choose action 0, while the others always choose action 1.
Definition of Strategic Learning
I study the outcomes of large anonymous games, so I let the number of agents grow large and study symmetric equilibria. Agents face a different stage game in each state of the world. Ex-ante, each agent is uncertain not only about the state of the world θ, but also about the realization of the proportion X. An agent receives his private signal and observes the actions of some predecessors. Given this information, he forms beliefs both about the underlying state of the world, and about the possible realizations of the proportion X. Then he chooses an action.
I study whether agents can successfully learn both about the state of the world and about the proportion X. In standard observational learning models, complete learning occurs when the fraction of adopters of the superior action approaches one. When payoff externalities exist, I say strategic learning occurs whenever agents' actions are ex-post optimal given both the state of the world and the realization of the proportion X. I first present two simple examples that illustrate when agents will be ex-post satisfied with their actions. I then introduce the formal definition of strategic learning. Formally, define the excess utility from choosing action 1 in state θ given X as v θ (X) ≡ u(1, X, θ) − u(0, X, θ). I say that x θ corresponds to a Nash Equilibrium of the stage game θ (and denote it by
Similarly, x ∈ NE whenever x θ ∈ NE θ for both θ ∈ {0, 1}.
The circle in Figure 1 (a) depicts the set NE for Example 1. There is a unique x θ ∈ NE θ for each θ ∈ {0, 1}, so NE is the singleton {( It is not obvious a priori whether the realized proportion will be close to elements of NE. The main result in this paper (Proposition 2) shows that this is in fact the case.
Intuitively, there is strategic learning when, as the number of agents grows large, the (random) proportion X gets close to NE. Because mistakes occur with positive probability, the proportion X may not get arbitrarily close to elements in NE. This is why I first take the number of agents to infinity and then the probability of mistakes to zero. Let the distance between the realized proportion x and the set NE be defined by d (x, NE) ≡ min y∈NE |x − y|.
DEFINITION. STRATEGIC LEARNING.
There is strategic learning when for all δ > 0 there
for all sequences of symmetric equilibria σ * ,T ∞ T=1 in games with probability of mistakes ε <ε.
Results

Average Action Convergence
The (random) proportion X converges to its expectation in both states of the world. Let the random variable X θ |σ represent the proportion of agents who choose action one, conditional on the state of the world θ, and given the strategy σ. The vector X|σ = (X 0 |σ, X 1 |σ) has realizations x = (x 0 , x 1 ) and expectation
A sequence of symmetric strategy profiles σ T ∞
T=1
induces a sequence of proportions
and a sequence of expected proportions E X|σ T ∞
. As highlighted by the notation, the expected proportion may change with T, and in fact need not converge.
I show that in spite of this, X|σ T converges in probability to its expectation. 
See Appendix A.2 for the proof.
A symmetric strategy profile σ T induces a Markov Chain over M-period histories of play. Any agent in positions t > M observes the actions of his M immediate predecessors.
As σ T is symmetric, the likelihood that agent i in position Q(i) > M chooses action 1 given sample ξ is independent of both his identity and his position. Then, σ T induces a Markov Chain {Y t } M<t≤T over M-period histories. Moreover, as agents make mistakes with probability ε > 0, the Markov Chain is irreducible and aperiodic. If σ T was fixed for all T, a standard argument (Ergodic Theorem) would suffice to show Proposition 1.
However, there is no guarantee that the equilibrium play is independent of the number of agents. In fact, it is easy to find examples where this is not the case.
A Markov Chain induced by an ε-constrained symmetric strategy profile σ T converges to its unique stationary distribution geometrically. Fix a strategy profile σ T and its induced Markov Chain {Y t } t>M , but let t → ∞. A coupling argument provides a geometric lower bound on the speed of convergence to the stationary distribution. What is more, for any ε > 0, this lower bound is independent of the particular strategy profile σ T . As a result, although {Y t } M<t≤T depends on a particular σ T , it must approach its expectation as T grows. In fact, X θ |σ T − E X θ |σ T converges in L 2 norm, so it also converges in probability.
Finally, the long-run behavior of the proportion X does not change when one agent deviates and picks a different strategy. To see this, compare the random proportion X|σ T induced by the symmetric profile to the one X| σ T induced when one agent deviates. Let i be the agent who deviates and chooses strategy σ i . Agents in positions earlier than Q(i)
are not affected by agent i's strategy. Agents in positions right after Q(i) are directly affected. Because of mistakes, the effect that agent i's action has on subsequent actions t > Q(i) vanishes (geometrically) as t increases. So as the total number of agents T increases, the fraction of agents who are directly affected by i's action goes to zero. Then
As I show next, Proposition 1 allows for a simple approximation to the utility agents obtain from playing this game.
Utility Convergence
Agents' expected utility converges to the utility of the expected average action. Agents' expected utility under symmetric profile σ T is simply
Define the utility of the expected average actionū T bȳ
LEMMA 2. EXPECTED UTILITY CONVERGENCE. Take any sequence of symmetric strategy
by Portmanteau's Theorem. This leads directly to lim T→∞ u σ T −ū T = 0.
Proposition 1 also allows for a simple approximation of the expected utility of deviations. Suppose that agent i chooses an alternative strategy σ i and let u σ T i , σ T −i denote the resulting expected utility from this deviation. Define the approximate utility of the deviation . Then,
The proof closely follows that of Lemma 2. See Appendix A.4 for the details.
The Set of Limit Points
Different profiles of play σ T induce different distributions over X. Then, the sequence of
need not have a limit. Although the proportion X approaches its expectation, this expectation itself may not converge. Then, I focus on the set L of limit points for sequences of equilibrium strategies E X|σ T ∞
T=1
.
DEFINITION. LIMIT POINTS. x = (x 0 , x 1 ) is a limit point if there exists a sequence of symmetric equilibrium strategy profiles σ T ∞
such that for some subsequence σ
The following corollary, which is an immediate consequence of Proposition 1, shows why one should focus on the set L of limit points. As the number of agents grows large, only proportions X close to L occur with positive probability COROLLARY 1. Take any sequence of symmetric strategy profiles σ T ∞
and any δ > 0.
See Appendix A.3 for the proof.
The set of limit points L is generated by equilibrium strategies. Optimality considerations allow for a partial characterization of L. Pick a sequence of symmetric equi-
and also a sequence of (alternative) ε-constrained strategies for agent i:
. Since σ T are equilibrium strategies, u σ T i , σ T −i − u σ T ≤ 0 for all σ T −i and for all T. Computing exactly u σ T i , σ T −i and u σ T is not possible in general. It requires specifying payoffs, the signal structure, the number M of agents sampled, and then also computing the equilibrium play. Fortunately, Lemmas 2 and 3 together make it easy to work with alternative strategies. Let the approximate improvement ∆ T be given by
The following corollary provides the foundation to take advantage of the approximate improvement ∆ T . I present two simple alternative strategies that restrict the possible elements of the set L of limit points. The first one consists in always following a particular action, regardless of the information received. This strategy proves useful when one action dominates the other in the limit. The second strategy consists on copying the action of one of the observed agents, unless the signal received is extremely informative. This strategy resembles the standard improvement principle in observational learning, and is useful when no action strictly dominates the other in the limit.
Alternative Strategy 1: Always Follow a Given Action
The first alternative strategy is simple: follow a given action, regardless of the information received. Lemma 4 shows how this strategy imposes restrictions on the elements of L.
LEMMA 4. DOMINANCE. Any limit actions (x 0 , x 1 ) ∈ L must satisfy:
See Appendix A.6 for the proof.
To illustrate how Lemma 4 partially characterizes the long-run outcomes of large games, consider first equation (2). When equation (2) is not satisfied, always playing action 1 leads to a utility that is strictly higher than the expected utility of the game.
Then, points that do not satisfy equation (2) Outcomes that make agents indifferent between actions in one state but not in the other can only be in L if all agents choose the non dominated action in both states, so ei- 
Alternative Strategy 2: Improve Upon a Sampled Agent
The second alternative strategy deals with the most interesting case: non-dominated actions. Take a limit point x = (x 0 , x 1 ) with v 0 (x 0 )v 1 (x 1 ) < 0. For simplicity, assume first that v 0 (x 0 ) < 0 and v 1 (x 1 ) > 0, so in the limit, agents want their action to match the state of the world. The question in this case is simple: do agents succeed in matching their actions to the state of the world? In other words, do non-dominated actions require (x 0 , x 1 ) = (0, 1)? This environment resembles one from observational learning without payoff externalities, so the proof here follows arguments similar to those from those envi- ronments.
I introduce an improvement principle to show how observational learning restricts which outcomes can be limit points. Consider a simple strategy. Each individual selects one individual at random from his sample. Let ξ = 1 if the action of the selected individual is a = 1 and ξ = 0 otherwise. The simple strategy mandates that the sampled action must be copied, unless a strong enough signal is received. Formally, focus on T big enough so
The simple strategy σ T is as follows:
This simple strategy improves upon the average utilityū T whenever signals are sufficiently informative and mistakes not that common. This is derived from two intuitive reasons. First, as long as signals more informative than the observed action ξ exist, the strategy σ is strictly better than just imitating ξ. Second, without mistakes, the utility of imitating the observed action ξ approaches the average utilityū T as the number of agents grows large.
LEMMA 5. IMPROVEMENT PRINCIPLE. Take any limit point (x 0 , x 1 ) ∈ L with v 0 (x 0 ) < 0 and v 1 (x 1 ) > 0. Then,
See Appendix A.7 for the proof.
When the outcome x does not satisfy Equation (4), agents can profit from following the simple strategy σ, so such an outcome cannot be a limit point. The term (4) increases in k and is strictly positive whenever k > l. 
is strictly positive there, so for ε small enough, equation (4) cannot hold. Next, take a more informative signal structure:
5 . Points outside of the dark shaded area have k > l. As the bounds on the informativeness of the signal become less restrictive, the shaded area becomes smaller. 8 Symmetrically, whenever k < l, For simplicity, I have only discussed so far the case with v 0 (x 0 ) < 0 and v 1 (x 1 ) > 0.
Lemma 6 presents an improvement principle that applies when v 0 (x 0 ) > 0 and v 1 (x 1 ) < 0, so agents want their action to match the opposite state of the world. The argument behind Lemma 6 is symmetric to that of Lemma 5. See the Online Appendix for details.
Strategic Learning
Lemmas 4, 5 and 6 jointly lead to the main result of this paper: there is strategic learning. 
Signals of Bounded Strength
With signals of bounded strength, agents' play need not become arbitrarily close to elements of NE. I show however that there must be some degree of learning through the observations of others. I provide a bound on how far from elements of NE long-run outcomes can be. This result is a direct consequence of Lemmas 4, 5 and 6. Intuitively, whenever an agent's choice is ex-post suboptimal, it is because he was wrong about the state. Instead, the gain in the population from choosing action one in state one is v 1 (x 1 )x 1 . I
show that the ratio between the loss and the gain must be bounded above by the informativeness of signals. This ratio is given by
Similarly, the ratio between the gain and the loss from choosing action zero is given
And it must happen that k ≥ l.
In general, let the set NE (l,l) contain all outcomes with ratios bounded by (l, l):
The following result shows bounded strategic learning must occur. Its definition is analogous to the definition of strategic learning, with NE replaced by NE (l,l) .
LEMMA 7. BOUNDED STRATEGIC LEARNING.
For all δ > 0 there existsε > 0, such that
for all sequences of symmetric equilibria σ * ,T ∞
T=1
in games with probability of mistakes ε <ε.
The argument behind Lemma 7 is similar to that of Proposition 2. See the Online Appendix for details.
Examples and Applications
This paper studies the long-run outcomes of observational learning in games. The examples that follow shed further light in this direction. First, I illustrate the role of mistakes with an example of pure observational learning (without payoff externalities). The second example illustrates the key role of the observation of others to attain strategic learning. 
Mistakes in Observational Learning without Payoff Externalities
No Observation of Others' Actions
Consider next an anti-coordination game like the one presented in Example 1, but with agents who do not observe others' actions. An agent obtains an utility of one when he chooses the superior technology. On top of it, others who choose the same action as him exert a congestion effect of amount k. 9 The excess utility function is 
continuous and monotonically increasing function f (X) has f (0) = 0 and f (1) = 1. Signals are of unbounded strength.
There is an election with two candidates: zero and one. f (X) denotes the probability that candidate one wins the election given that a fraction X choose him. 10 It is easy to show that there is an equilibrium where all agents choose action 1, regardless of what they observe. Under such strategy of play, when the number of agents grows large the proportion X is close to 1 − ε in both states of the world. Then, it is always optimal to choose action 1.
Multiple Equilibria in Coordination Games
Interestingly, there is another equilibrium where agents coordinate on the superior technology. This equilibrium has a simple form. Take a sequence of symmetric strategy 10 In Callander [2007] , f (X) = 1 if X < profiles where σ T (s, ξ) = σ(s, ξ) does not change with T and is given by:
Agents follow an informative signal and mimic their predecessor if the signal is uninformative. Under this profile of play, the proportion X is close to γ in state 0 and to 1 − γ in state 1 (for T large and ε small). This implies that an agent wants his action to match the state of the world. Moreover, the sample is informative about the state of the world. So indeed an agent who receives an uninformative signal copies the action of his predecessor.
To sum up, for big enough T, strategy σ is an equilibrium.
Discussion
I study the long-run outcomes of observational learning with payoff externalities. In several economic situations, payoffs depend both on an uncertain state of the world and on others' actions. Individuals obtain information about their environment from private signals, and also by observing others. As agents need to learn both about the state of the world and about the play of others, informational externalities are confounded with coordination motives. Agents are uncertain about the true state of nature, so they do not know on which outcome to coordinate on. In addition, even if they knew the state, they would still not observe the aggregate play, so it would not be obvious which action to choose. Finally, a new strategic consideration arises with payoff externalities: agents may change their behavior in order to influence others.
I show that in spite of these confounding factors, there is strategic learning: agents' actions are ex-post optimal given the state of the world and the actions of others. As long as the number of agents grows large, and they sometimes make mistakes, each agent's individual influence on the aggregate outcome becomes negligible. Individuals are aware of this, and so they act as if they could not influence the aggregate play. In large games, the aggregate behavior becomes almost deterministic. I can then translate an environ- 
A. Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
The proof of existence of a symmetric equilibrium builds upon Theorem 3 in Cheng, Reeves, Vorobeychik, and Wellman [2004] . Cheng et al. [2004] show that a pure strategy symmetric equilibrium exists in symmetric infinite games with compact, convex strategy sets and continuous and quasiconcave utility functions. I first present Theorem 3 in Cheng et al. [2004] and then show how it applies to the environment in the present paper.
For each player i ∈ I, let R i be a set of strategies (with ρ i ∈ R i ). Agent i's payoffs from
DEFINITION. SYMMETRIC GAMES (DEFINITION 2 IN CHENG ET AL. [2004]). A normal-
form game is symmetric if the players have identical strategy spaces (R i = R for all i ∈ I) and u i (ρ i , ρ −i ) = u j (ρ j , ρ −j ) for ρ i = ρ j and ρ −i = ρ −j for all i, j ∈ I. Thus we can write u(ρ i , ρ −i )
for the utility to any player playing strategy ρ i in profile ρ. Then, the tuple [I, R, u()] denotes a symmetric game. 
There is a many to one mapping σ i → ρ i . It is without loss of generality to work directly with agents choosing ρ i from the feasible set
The set of strategies Σ is the same for all agents, so R i = R for all i ∈ I. Conveniently, R is a subset of an Euclidean space of dimension |Ξ| · |Θ|. R is non-empty and compact (see Appendix A.2 in Monzón and Rapp [2014] for the proof). Next, take ρ i ∈ R and ρ i ∈ R, with ρ i derived from σ i and ρ i from σ i . Then
utility as a function of ρ becomes
It is simple to see that
two channels. First, they affect the distribution of H t . Second, they affect the distribution of X θ . Utility u i (ρ i , ρ −i ) is continuous in ρ −i through both channels (note that u(a i , X, θ)
is continuous in X). Therefore, payoffs u i (ρ i , ρ −i ) are continuous in ρ. Finally, note that
Then, by Theorem 3 in Cheng et al. [2004] there exists ρ * ∈ R such that ρ * is a best response to ρ −i = (ρ * , . . . , ρ * ).
Thus, if each agent plays a strategy σ * that maps to ρ * , all play a best response. As a result, there exists a symmetric equilibrium σ * of the game. 
A.2 Proof of Proposition
where K is large enough so that ρ = min i,j p
The proof is based on a standard coupling argument. It follows closely sections 2.7 and 2.8 of Lindvall [1992] . Let Y n be the Markov Chain with transition matrix P but started at the stationary distribution µ. Instead, let Y n be the Markov Chain with transition matrix P but started at some distribution λ. Let N be the first period in which these two chains meet: N = min k : Y k = Y k . Finally let Y n be given by:
Since Y is finite, and the Markov Chain Y is irreducible and aperiodic, there exists a finite K > 0 large enough so that: ρ = min i,j p (K) ij > 0. Then, for any two distributions µ and λ,
where n/K is the integer part of n/K. To avoid using n/K , note that
With 
The lower bound ε M is independent of the strategy profile σ τ .
Let Y 1 be all histories where the last agent chose action a = 1 and letμ τ ≡ ∑ y∈Y 1 µ τ y . Then, Lemma 8 guarantees that for any distribution over states in period t:
This bound holds for any symmetric strategy profile σ τ .
In what follows, I fix a state of the world θ, so from now on I drop the subindex θ.
Also, I fix a strategy profile σ τ . I use τ to index strategy profiles and T to index the number of agents. Let V(σ τ ) denote the variance of X|σ τ , for any number of players T:
2 < δ for all T > T and for all τ. This implies that
that is, X|σ T − E X|σ T converges to zero in L 2 norm, which implies convergence in probability.
Fix a strategy profile σ τ and define V(σ τ ) as follows:
It is easy to see that
Regarding the remaining terms, note that
for any σ τ . Then,
So the second term in equation (6) becomes:
Then, pick any b > 0. There exists T such that for all T > T, and for all σ τ , V(σ τ ) < b.
The proof of the second part of Proposition 1 is as follows. Let agent i be in position t = Q(i). Define two Markov Chains, both with the same transition matrix P. These chains start right after agent i plays. Their only difference is the starting distribution over states. First, (Y n ) n≥t+1 has agent i following strategy σ i . Second, Y n n≥t+1 has agent i following strategy σ i . As before, let N be the first period in which these two chains meet.
By equation (5), Pr (N > n) ≤ cδ n . Note that for any N = n,
, Q(i) − 1} and for t ∈ {Q(i) + n, T}. Then,
To sum up, for any strategy profile σ T ,
Then for all b > 0, there exists n such that b ≥ cδ n . Fix b and n. There is always a T, so that n/T < b. Then,
Finally, note that both
A.3 Proof of Corollary 1
The distance d (X, L) can be bounded above as follows:
The set L includes all limit points for convergent subsequences of
A.4 Proof of Lemma 3
Agent i's expected utility u σ T i , σ T −i is given by:
Assume instead that there exists δ > 0 such that
. This leads directly to lim T→∞ u σ T i , σ T −i − u T = 0.
A.6 Proof of Lemma 4
Lemma 4 deals with the case in which an action is dominant (either weakly or strictly) in the limit. Consider two alternative strategies, σ 0 : "always play action 0", and σ 1 : "al- (1 − ε − x θ ) v θ (x θ ) ≤ 0.
Next, assume v 0 (x 0 )v 1 (x 1 ) ≥ 0. Then, if v θ (x θ ) < 0, equation (1) The rest of the proof is a direct result of the following Lemma:
LEMMA 9. If x θ = ε for some θ ∈ {0, 1}, then x = (ε, ε). Similarly, if x θ = 1 − ε for some θ ∈ {0, 1}, then x = (1 − ε, 1 − ε).
Proof. Assume that x 1 = 1 − ε, but x 0 = 1 − ε. The proof is analog for all other cases.
The expected proportion E σ T [X θ ] can be expressed as follows: 
which implies that lim T→∞ s∈S σ T (s, ξ)dν 0 (s) = 1 − ε for all ξ ∈ Ξ M , and so x 0 = 1 − ε.
To see why equation (7) Because of absolute continuity, since G 0 (l) > 0, then G 1 (l) > 0. So for all elements of
, s∈S t dν 1 (s) ≥ G 1 (l) > 0. Then, s∈S t dν 1 (s) cannot converge to zero.
A.7 Proof of Lemma 5
Let π T θ ≡ P σ T ξ = 1 | θ . I show first the following intermediate lemma. 
τ+M−1
The same argument guarantees that
Given equations (8) and (9),
So Corollary 2 leads directly to equation (4).
A.8 Proof of Proposition 2
I present first the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 3. (PROPOSITION 11 IN MONZÓN AND RAPP [2014]).
For all l ∈ (l, l),
See Monzón and Rapp [2014] for the proof.
Let NE δ = x ∈ [0, 1] 2 : d (x, NE) ≤ δ be the set of all points which are δ-close to elements of NE and let L ε denote the set of limit points in a game with mistake probability that if v θ (x θ ) < 0, thenx θ = 0. Sox ∈ NE, and thus I have reached a contradiction. Then, for any σ, P σ (d (X, NE) < δ) ≥ P σ (d (X, L ε ) < δ/2). By Corollary 1, for all δ/2 > 0, and all sequences of symmetric equilibria:
